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ESSAY

Professor Juenger's Challenge to the
Interest Analysis Approach to Choiceof-Law: An Appreciation and a
Response
Robert A. Sedler*

INTRODUCTION: IN APPRECIATION OF PROFESSOR JUENGER

The interest analysis approach to the resolution of choice-of-law
problems has been the subject of unremitting academic attack ever since
its inception. As a staunch proponent of the interest analysis approach,
I have on numerous occasions responded to these attacks. I have tried to
demonstrate that the criticisms of interest analysis as a basic approach
to choice-of-law are not well-founded.' More significantly perhaps, I
have set forth an empirical justification for interest analysis as the preferred approach to choice-of-law. Interest analysis, I maintain, is the
preferred approach to resolving choice-of-law problems because it
works. More so than any other approach to choice-of-law, interest analysis provides functionally sound and fair solutions to the choice-of-law
* Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B. 1956; J.D. 1959, University of
Pittsburgh.

See, e.g., Sedler, Interest Analysis as the PreferredApproach to Choice-of-Law, A
Response to Professor Brilmayer's "Foundational Attack," 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483
(1985) [hereafter Preferred Approach]; Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the "New Critics," 34 MERcER L. REV.
593 (1983) [hereafter New Critics]; Sedler, The Governmental Interest Approach to
Choice-of-Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 UCLA L. REv. 181, 190-220
(1977) [hereafter Governmental Interests].
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issues. I also have demonstrated that in practice the courts that have
abandoned the traditional approach to choice-of-law generally employ
interest analysis to resolve choice-of-law problems. They employ interest analysis regardless of which "modern" approach to choice-of-law
they purportedly are following. 2
One of the most distinguished contemporary conflicts scholars is Professor Friedrich K. Juenger of the University of California at Davis
School of Law. More so than any other contemporary American conflicts scholar, Professor Juenger has brought a unique comparative and
historical perspective to the subject.3 He specifically has related modern
American approaches to their historical antecedents on the Continent.
He also has delineated the historical progression and evolution of conflicts law and theory to the present time.4 Because of his comparative
expertise and orientation he also functions as a bridge between American and foreign legal systems. His role facilitates the exchange of
knowledge and ideas between American and foreign conflicts scholars.
He thus provides an international and comparative dimension to the
development of American conflicts law and theory. We all are so much
richer because of Professor Juenger's endeavors in this regard.
He too, however, is an unremitting critic of interest analysis. But for
a number of reasons, the nature of his criticism is very special. As such,
it calls for a very careful and respectful response. The purpose of this
Essay, therefore, is to analyze and respond to Professor Juenger's criticisms of interest analysis. I will demonstrate anew my contention that
interest analysis is the preferred approach to the resolution of choice-oflaw problems.

2 By this I mean that the results that courts reach in practice are consistent with the
results that would be reached under the interest analysis approach as developed by the
late Brainerd Currie and refined by his followers, including forum preference in the
true conflict situation. For a discussion of the application of the interest analysis approach by courts in practice, see New Critics, supra note 1, at 635-43; Governmental
Interests, supra note I, at 227-33.
3 In doing so, Professor Juenger has followed in the path of the late Albert A.
Ehrenzweig of the University of California at Berkeley. See, e.g., A. EHRENZWEIG,
TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1962).
4 See F. JUENGER, GENERAL COURSE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW ch. 1
(1983) [hereafter GENERAL COURSE]; see also Juenger, A Page of History, 35 MERCER
L. REV. 419 (1984).
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Interest Analysis
PROFESSOR JUENGER'S CRITICISMS OF INTEREST ANALYSIS

A.

The Structural Unsoundness: Interest Analysis and
Unilateralism

Professor Juenger's first and most fundamental criticism of interest
analysis is that it is a structurally unsound method of dealing with
choice-of-law problems. Juenger relates interest analysis to its historical
antecedents. He explains it as a unilateralist method of approaching
choice-of-law. According to Juenger, in all the centuries of trying to
resolve conflicts problems,5 three basic methods of resolution have
emerged: "(1) The creation of multistate rules of decision (the substantive law approach); (2) A choice from among the potentially applicable
local rules of decision premised on ascertaining their personal and territorial reach (the unilateral approach); and. (3) The interposition of
.choice-of-law rules (the multilateral approach)." 6
Juenger, here agreeing with Currie and other proponents of interest
analysis, strongly disfavors the multilateral approach, which tries to resolve choice-of-law problems on the basis of "content-neutral" choiceof-law rules. 7 Referring to this approach as the "classical doctrine," he
says that, using the "yardsticks of fairness and stability," the classical
doctrine has been a failure. The approach is "incapable of accomplishing its goal of decisional harmony," "works capriciously," and "produces sound results in multistate cases only by happenstance or through
5 Analytically, choice-of-law involves a decision as to the law to be applied to the
resolution of legal issues in cases containing a foreign element. A case contains a foreign
element when all the legally significant facts did not occur in a single state, and/or all
the parties are not residents of the same state. Cases containing a foreign element do
not always give rise to a choice-of-law issue. A choice-of-law issue arises only when the
laws of the involved states differ on one or more of the issues presented in the case.
6 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 168. Professor Juenger states that all of these
approaches have coexisted since the Middle Ages. Id.
Professor Juenger contends that while multilateral rules had existed since the Middle Ages and are found in Huber's and Story's view of comity, Savigny first "explicate[d] a cogent and coherent rationale for neutral, even-handed conflicts rules that
accord foreign law the same importance as the lexfori," and "laid the methodological
foundation for multilateralism on which others could build." Id. at 163. Juenger also
states that:
Multilateralism continues to occupy a commanding position, which has
been seriously challenged only recently, when the American "conflicts
revolution" began to take hold. Outside the United States, Savigny's ideology still dominates despite the fact that several European scholars, sufficiently disenchanted with mechanical jurisprudence, have mounted an allout attack on Savigny's conceptual edifice.
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manipulation."' Juenger states that these deficiencies are not accidental. In fact, the problems "inhere in the very structure of a seemingly
simple methodology that engenders complex artificial problems, [which]
in turn, call for artificial solutions." 9 As a result, the classical doctrine
is "riddled with incongruities and requires an extraordinary level of
abstraction to deal with such mundane subjects as marriage, divorce,
contract and tort law.' 1° Juenger's attack on multilateralism as a basic
method of dealing with choice-of-law problems adds a new dimension
to the "anti-rules" position. As an opponent of the traditional approach, I am very pleased that he attacks it in this manner. 1
Professor Juenger, however, also adds a new dimension to the challenge to interest analysis as a basic method of dealing with choice-oflaw problems. He relates interest analysis to unilateralism and contends
that unilateralism is unsound because it proceeds on the same underlying premises as multilateralism. As such, it suffers from the same structural deficiencies. The essence of unilateralism, says Juenger, is making
a choice from potentially applicable local rules premised on ascertaining their personal or territorial reach. 2 The assumption is that a particular rule of law "wants to apply" or "does not want to apply" to a
particular situation containing out-of-state connections. 3 Juenger
Id. at 206.
9 Id.
10 Id. According to Juenger, the "proper law" approach, as reflected in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, suffers the same deficiencies as the
"traditional" or "classical" approach reflected in the original Restatement. He suggests
that the "proper law" approach "tries to preserve multilateralism without paying the
price," and so "substitute[s] hollow formulae for precise connecting factors." GENERAL
COURSE, supra note 4, at 235. He concludes that it "fails to deal in a forthright manner with the underlying malaise whose root cause is the multilateralist assumption that
choice-of-law is concerned with localizing legal relationships rather than with substantive values." Id. at 235-36.
u See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 208-16; Sedler, Interstate Accidents
and the Unprovided-For case: Reflections on Neumeier v. Kuehner, 1 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 125, 130-37 (1973) [hereafter Interstate Accidents]. A rules approach to choiceof-law - which Professor Juenger relates to multilateralism as a method of dealing
with choice-of-law problems - is something very different from the development of
rules of choice-of-law. The development of rules results from a court's resolution of
conflicts issues on a case-by-case basis with reference to considerations of policy and
fairness to the parties, and the normal workings of binding precedent and stare decisis.
See Sedler, Rules of Choice-of-Law Versus Choice-of-Law Rules: Judicial Method in
Conflicts Torts Cases, 44 TENN. L. REV. 975, 978-81, 1032 (1977) [hereafter Judicial
Method].
8

12 See GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 168.

13Juenger says that Currie, like other unilateralists, "started from the dubious as-
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places interest analysis in a direct line of succession from the ItalianFrench statutist theory and says that "these modern unilateralists share
the statutists' assumption that it is possible to discern the spatial reach
of rules. ' 14 While the statutists used a system of classifying laws according to their personal or territorial purport," the proponents of interest analysis, whom Juenger refers to as the "neo-statutists," instead
"call for an ad hoc interpretation of each particular rule of decision
that vies for application.' 1 6 The interest analysis approach "seeks to
discover which of the various substantive norms seemingly in conflict,
in light of their underlying policies and the interests of the states in
vindicating these policies, do in fact claim to control a given multistate
issue."' 7
Juenger contends that unilateralism is unsound as a basic method of
dealing with choice-of-law problems because it proceeds on the same
unsound underlying premises as multilateralism. He states as follows:
Although they have a different thrust, require different analyses and yield
different results, unilateralism and multilateralism share the fundamental
tenet that solutions to multistate problems can be derived from an allocation of lawmaking power. Both are spatially oriented in the sense that
they accord a personal or territorial dimension to law.18

And since they proceed from a common point of departure, they both
"encounter similar theoretical and practical difficulties."' 19
The cause of these theoretical and practical difficulties, according to
Juenger, is that in some cases the laws of more than one state may
"want to apply" to the same situation. In other cases, the law of neither
state "may want to apply to the same situation." As regards interest
analysis, the former case presents the true conflict - both states have a
real interest in applying their law in order to implement the policy
reflected in that law. The latter case presents the unprovided-for case
- neither state has a real interest in applying its law in order to imsumption that private laws are imbued with a volonte d'application." Id. at 238.
14 Id. at 215. Juenger also states that Wachter attempted to revive unilateralism in
Germany in the 19th century by arguing that judges should inquire whether local rules
of decision, in light of their "spirit" (or "policy," to use Currie's term), should be
applied in a case containing a foreign element. Id. at 216. Wachter, however, soon was
overshadowed by Savigny. Id.
"5 See id. at 139-47 (discussing Italian and French statutists of Middle Ages).
16 Id. at 215.
17

Id.

1I

Id. at 255.

19 Id. at 256.
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plement the policy reflected in that law. 20 The problems of "overlap"

and "gap," says Juenger, have long antedated the development of interest analysis:
Whenever the parties to a lawsuit hail from different states, Currie's conceptual framework produces "true conflicts" and "unprovided-for cases."
Conundrums of this kind are neither novel nor peculiar to Currie's teachings. They are merely the symptoms of a birth defect that afflicts any
unilateralist approach, that is to say the attempt to resolve multistate
problems by focusing on the spatial reach of substantive rules. Long before
similar "discoveries" were made in the United States, foreign unilateralists
wondered what should happen if more than one state "wishes" to control
a given transaction, or if no state makes such a claim. European authors
coined the terms "cumuls," to describe the overlap of multiple claims to
legislative jurisdiction, and "lacunes," to describe the legal gaps
that result
21
from the sublime disinterest of states in a given transaction.

He goes on to say that "[tlhe unilateralists' unconvincing attempts to
resolve the spurious problems of their own making highlight the shortcomings of their method. '22 They "must either resort to a blunt forum
preference 23 or introduce multilateralist solutions with their own attendant complexities. ' 24 As a result, a unilateralist approach, such as
interest analysis, cannot "guarantee predictability and consistency in
the adjudication of multistate disputes" 25 any more than multilateralism
can.
Having found unilateralism as well as multilateralism unsatisfactory
as a basic method of dealing with choice-of-law problems, Juenger
turns to the third basic method, the substantive law or "result-selective"
approach. He refers to multilateralism, as reflected in the broad stateselecting rules of the traditional approach, and unilateralism, as reflected in interest analysis, as the two "conflicts orthodoxies." He says
20 See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 188-90 (discussing the "true conflict" and the "unprovided-for case"). Interest analysis, however, also provides for a
third situation. That situation occurs when the states have conflicting policies but only
one of the states has an interest in applying its law. Or, as Juenger would say, only one
state's law "wants to apply." Currie calls this situation a false conflict. See infra notes
84-92 and accompanying text.
21 Juenger, What Now?, 46 OHIo ST. L.J. 509, 510-11 (1985).
2
Id. at 511.
23 Juenger states that, "The blunt forum-law preference Currie and others have advocated is too drastic an expedient to please American judges." Id.
24 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 257. Juenger argues that comparative impairment and "similar efforts to multilateralize unilateralism are too fine-spun and
implausible to appeal to anybody but devoutly scholastic minds." What Now?, supra
note 21, at 511.
25 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 257.

Interest Analysis

1990]

that today, "the real clash is between a result-conscious judiciary and
26
scholars who are committed to one or the other conflicts orthodoxy."
Juenger maintains that in multistate transactions, courts should not
try "to allocate spheres of legislative competence." 27 Instead, courts
should create "substantive rules that respond to interstate and international realities." 2 They should engage in a "critical comparative evaluation of 'conflicting' rules," and "quite naturally favour the law they
perceive to be superior. '29 Like Leflar, who has identified preference
for the "better law" as one of the choice-influencing considerations in
conflicts cases, 30 Juenger says that courts do in fact take the "better
law" into account. But unlike Leflar, who does not advocate the "better
law" as a normative consideration, 3' Juenger says that choice-of-law in
multistate cases should be based entirely on which of the conflicting
rules "better responds to interstate and international realities."
Central to Juenger's thesis is the proposition that the results in multistate cases should differ from the results in domestic cases precisely
because different considerations apply to the resolution of multistate
cases than to domestic ones. Here again, Juenger brings a historical
perspective to the analysis. He goes back to the Roman praetor peregrinus, who was empowered to deal with litigation involving Romans
and foreigners, and who "created a separate body of rules, which was
considerably more flexible and functional than the ius civile that governed relations between Roman citizens.''32 Likewise he goes back to
the English mercantile and admiralty courts, which did not apply the
common law, but instead respectively applied "a common European lex
mercatoria [and] sources widely scattered over time and space," 33 which
could properly be referred to as a "law of nations." According to
Juenger, in these situations courts "did not discharge their supranational responsibilities by pondering ways to allocate spheres of legislative jurisdiction. ' 34 Instead, they "went to the heart of the matter and
devised substantive solutions responsive to the exigencies of the multi26

Id.

27

Id. at 268.

at 254.

2 Id.
29

Id.

30 See generally Leflar,
54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584,

Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations,
1585-88 (1966).
31 See Leflar, The "New" Choice-of-Law, 21 AM. U.L. REV. 457, 474 (1972).
32 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 138.
31Id. at 151.
3 Id. at 265.
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state transactions with which they were confronted. '35
Juenger emphasizes that result-selectivity, or teleology, as Juenger
calls it, always has pervaded choice-of-law. He contends that resultselectivity is used in the manipulative techniques involved in the traditional approach, 36 in the alternative reference approaches in continental
conflicts law, 7 in legislation and conventions, 38 and finally in the use of
the "better law" adhered to by courts that follow Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. In this regard, Juenger says that courts that follow Leflar's approach "have experienced little difficulty in deciding
' 39
multistate disputes justly and predictably.
What distinguishes Juenger's position from the other critics of interest analysis is his frank advocacy of result-selectivity or substantive law
approach. According to Juenger, such an approach, unlike interest
analysis, would "guarantee predictability and consistency in the adjudication of multistate disputes":
[T]he substantive law approach promotes certainty, predictability and decisional harmony, the very goals that orthodox doctrines are unable to attain. If courts identify those rules of decision that are appropriate for multistate transactions, a new ius commune will evolve, composed of precepts
whose merits have been judicially certified. The interstitial law-making of
national courts can thus contribute to a shared fund of private law.
31 Id. Interestingly enough, Juenger also lists the "federal common law" of the Swift
v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), era as another example of the "substantive law
approach in action." GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 265.
36 Id. at 274.
37 See id. at 275 (discussing German choice-of-law rule in tort cases that enables

plaintiff to obtain benefit of more favorable law of either place of acting or place of
harm).
38 See id. at 276-84.
19Id. at 275. He adds the following proviso: "except in those few cases where judges
thought that the forum's governmental interests required application of substandard
forum law." Id. As I will point out, whenever courts following Leflar's choice-influencing considerations approach have found a conflict between "advancement of the forum's
governmental interests" and "preference for the better law," they invariably have favored "advancement of the forum's governmental interests." Courts favor this consideration even if this meant applying the forum's "worse law." Whenever the forum has
invoked the "better law" consideration, the "better law" not coincidentally, has been its
own. This includes the situation where the forum had no real interest in applying its
own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law. In practice, the application of choice-influencing considerations invariably has meant the application of the
forum's own law, whether "better" or "worse." And so in practice, the choice-influencing considerations approach has led to the application of the law of the forum more so
than would be called for under the interest analysis approach. See infra notes 124-28
and accompanying text.
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Juenger recognizes that "the creation of such a body of uniform law
presupposes a general consensus, and one may predict that courts will
not invariably agree in their assessment of specific rules." 41 Differences,
however, can be resolved by statutes or conventions addressed to specific
issues. The substantive law approach "can persuade foreign jurisdictions to conform their law to prevailing standards. ' 42 In any event,
Juenger maintains that the substantive law approach still is preferable
because "[t]he conscious efforts of judges to adjudicate multistate disputes by applying rules that, in their opinion, are of superior quality
ought to assure a greater number of sound decisions than any other
'43
doctrine could conceivably produce.
Juenger illustrates the substantive law approach in the products liability context by an alternative reference solution that identifies the
connecting factors 44 and sets forth a criterion for selection among the
potentially applicable laws. The connecting factors are (1) the place
where the injury occurred, (2) the place where the conduct causing the
injury occurred, (3) the place where the product was acquired, and (4)
the home state of the parties. 4 The criterion for selection, with respect
to each issue involved in the case, is "that rule of decision which most
closely accords with modern standards of products liability. ' 46
Professor Juenger's analysis of the basic methods of dealing with
choice-of-law problems from an historical and comparative perspective
leads him to the conclusion that "[t]he only choice-of-law approach still
worth trying is one that looks to values that transcend state bounda40 GENERAL COURSE,
41 Id. at 288.
42

supra note 4, at 287-88.

Id.

43 Id.
44 "Connecting factors" refers to the contacts the fact pattern has with the states that
may furnish the substantive law for the case. Specifically, these states' substantive laws
make up the pool from which a choice-of-law is made.
4s These connecting factors are based on those used to identify the state of the most

significant relationship in tort cases under
LAWS § 145 (1968).
46 GENERAL COURSE,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF

supra note 4, at 290. In a recent article, Professor Juenger
has carried this alternative reference approach over to "mass disasters." The connecting
factors here are (1) the place of the tortfeasor's conduct, (2) the place of injury, and (3)
the home state of each party. As to each issue, "the court shall select from the laws of
these jurisdictions the most suitable rule of decision." Juenger, Mass Disasters and the
Conflict of Laws, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 105, 126 [hereafter Mass Disasters].
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ries. ' '4 7 He thus advocates a selection process that is based on the
"qualitative evaluation of conflicting rules of decision. ' 4 This approach, he says, "would yield greater predictability and uniformity
49
than either unilateralism or multilateralism can possibly guarantee.
In any event, it will produce better results in particular cases.5 0
In summary, Professor Juenger's most fundamental criticism of interest analysis is that it is a structurally unsound method of dealing
with choice-of-law problems because it is premised on ascertaining the
personal or territorial reach of substantive law rules. This effort at the
"allocation of lawmaking power" fails because it encounters theoretical
and practical difficulties when the law of more than one state "wants to
apply" or the law of neither state "wants to apply" to the same situation. The "overlap" occurs in the true conflict situation and the "gap"
in the unprovided-for case situation. A forum preference solution,
which he says is the solution that Currie advocated for both situations,
is too drastic for judges to accept. Any "multilateralist solution," such
as comparative impairment or other proposed solutions to the true conflict, 51 all have their "independent complexities." As a result, interest
analysis cannot "guarantee predictability and consistency in the adjudication of multistate disputes. ' 52 A substantive law or result-selective approach, contends Juenger, not only will guarantee the predictability
and consistency that interest analysis lacks, but it will produce better
results in particular cases. This is because it will bring about the application of the substantive law that better "respond[s] to interstate and
international realities."5 3
In this Essay I answer Professor Juenger's fundamental criticism of
interest analysis. I accomplish this task by comparing the results in
practice that are reached under the interest analysis approach and the
results that are reached under Professor Juenger's substantive law approach. I also discuss the different perception that these two approaches
have of the function of the courts in deciding conflicts cases and the
47 GENERAL
48 Id.
49 Id.

COURSE,

supra note 4, at 321.

10See id. Professor Juenger also suggests that such an approach will contribute to
domestic law reform because "[s]elective importation of superior foreign rules provides
a powerful incentive to bring forum law up to the standards of international justice,
thereby encouraging domestic reform." Id.
"1 See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 216-18 (discussing proposed solutions, other than forum preference, to true conflict situation).
52 GENERAL COURSE,

5 Id. at 268.

supra note 4, at 257.
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purpose of conflicts law in our legal system. Professor Juenger and I
vastly disagree on the function of the courts in deciding conflicts cases
and the purpose of conflicts law in our legal system. My view, however, is much closer to the perception that American courts themselves
have of the court's function and the purpose of conflicts law. I also
establish that courts that in effect apply the interest analysis in practice
reach results that functionally are sound and fair to the parties. Now,
however, I want to discuss Professor Juenger's two other essential criticisms of interest analysis and his views on the operation of the interest
analysis approach in practice.
B.

The Absence of "Governmental Interests" in Private Litigation

In addition to the claimed structural unsoundness of interest analysis,
Professor Juenger maintains that it conceptually is flawed because it
proceeds on the assumption that states have "governmental interests" in
applying rules of substantive law in litigation between private persons.
Juenger insists that states do not have such "governmental interests."
This being so, to base an approach to choice-of-law on the implementation of "non-existent" governmental interests is conceptually unsound.
Juenger states that no empirical evidence exists to support the proposition that states have governmental interests in litigation between
private parties to effectuate the policies reflected in their substantive
4
law, and that Currie simply considered the proposition axiomatic.1
Juenger says that the notion that states "desire" to have their law applied in litigation between private persons is a fictitious concept. 5 He
says that to believe that states do have such interests "requires a leap of
faith, a willingness to cast Leviathan as a human being with wants and
desires." 56 Juenger goes on to draw a distinction between what he calls
"real" and "spurious" governmental interests. "Real" governmental interests refer to a state's fiscal and proprietary interests, such as those
connected with revenue, escheat, boundary disputes, and water rights.5 7
s4 Juenger, Governmental Interests -

Real and Spurious - in Multistate Disputes, 21 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 515, 518 (1988) [hereafter Real and Spurious].
11Juenger, Choice-of-Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 209 (1969).
16 Real and Spurious, supra note 54, at 519.
17 See id. at 519-28. Juenger states that when such conflicts of "real interests" arise
between states, the Supreme Court has not permitted "state courts to effectuate domestic policies at the expense of sister-states," but instead has applied "hard-and-fast rules
to minimize the potential for friction in our federal system." Id. at 519. Juenger discusses the escheat and multiple inheritance taxation cases and other cases that have
involved the exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction over "cases in which a State
shall be a Party" under Art. III, § 2, cl.2. He refers to these "real interests" as
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The "governmental interests" that are the basis of the interest analysis approach, says Juenger, are "spurious," because they do not involve
a state's proprietary or fiscal interests. 8 This being so, the very notion
of governmental interests as the basis for resolving choice-of-law
problems is "highly implausible." Further, he views interest analysis
like other unilateralist approaches as "inspired by speculations about
sovereignty, as Currie's exaggerated deference to governmental concerns
illustrates." ' 9
Professor Juenger, however, also has recognized a "real" governmental interest in the application of regulatory laws, such as antitrust or
securities laws. He does so in the context of discussing the extraterritorial application of federal regulatory laws. He says that "no one questions the reality of foreign and domestic interests that are at loggerheads when, for instance, the United States proceeds against restrictive
trade practices that are lawful in the defendant's home country." 6 He
goes to great pains to distinguish the nature of these governmental interests from "governmental interests in domestic choice-of-law cases,"
'6
which are "tenuous if not entirely lacking." '
Professor Juenger unwittingly may have succeeded, by this example,
in blurring what he contends is a sharp distinction between "real" and
"spurious" governmental interests in the context of disputes between
private litigants. The United States can enforce antitrust and securities
laws directly against the offending party, but private parties can enforce these laws as well. Congress has encouraged such enforcement by
providing a multiple of damages awards and the recovery of attorneys
fees by successful plaintiffs. Regulatory laws such as these and other
"weighty enough to prompt the Supreme Court to assume its role as the ultimate arbiter in our federal system." Id. at 528.
18 He notes that these kind of interests are "too trivial to warrant the exercise of
original jurisdiction." Id. at 528. Juenger further argues that the states generally are
not required by full faith and credit to subordinate their interest to that of another
state. "Such freedom implies the power of each state to subvert the interests of any
are too trivial to arouse the
other; a conclusion that is tolerable only if the interests .
states' susceptibilities." Id. at 529.
59 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 239.
60Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?:A Comment on Professor
Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PR6BS., Summer 1987, at 42.
61 Id. Juenger also states that the problems presented by the extraterritorial application of federal regulatory laws are "quite different from run-of-the-mill conflicts questions." Id. at 41. Analytically, the issue is not one of choice-of-law, but of whether to
enforce the domestic statute or dismiss the case. "[T]he propriety of drawing an analogy between the law of conflicts and the extraterritorial application of regulatory enactments is questionable." Id.
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economic regulation that reflects government regulatory policy 62 directly implicate the "social engineering" function of law. 63 As indicated
by the antitrust and securities laws example, the state may rely on private persons whose interests those laws affect to implement the "social
engineering" policy. 64 Thus, the United States clearly has a governmen-

tal interest in implementing the policy reflected in the antitrust and
securities laws. This interest is implicated not only when the United
States is acting to enforce these laws, but also when these laws are
invoked by an injured party in a private action brought against an alleged violator.
As regards the state's "real" governmental interest, it is irrelevant
that private party litigation will implement the regulatory policies reflected in antitrust and securities laws 65 An even clearer example of a
"real" governmental interest, if that is possible, is when the state relies
on an injured party to pursue private litigation for intentional torts instead of criminal prosecution to deter and redress violations of personal
security. For example, if two spouses from State X, a spousal immunity
state, are involved in an altercation in State Y, a liability state, it cannot
be doubted that if State Y is the forum it has a "real" governmental
interest in applying its law and imposing liability on the battering
spouse.
I would submit that the same "real" governmental interest is present
with respect to tort rules governing enterprise liability. In this country,
tort law rather than social insurance is still the primary method of providing compensation for accident victims. A state has a "real" governmental interest in having its tort law applied to implement the compensatory policy reflected in that law in the same manner as it would be
66
interested in applying its social insurance law.

My point is that it is not possible, as Professor Juenger maintains, to
62 See, e.g., Barnes Group Inc. v. C & C Prods., Inc., 716 F.2d 1023, 1029-31 (4th
Cir. 1983) (refusing to recognize express choice-of-law to validate covenant not to compete that was invalid under otherwise applicable law).
63 For a discussion of the state's interest in the enforcement of laws involving the
"social engineering" function, see A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICEOF-LAw 64-66, 72-73 (1970).
64 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterps., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (per curiam) (discussing vindication of public interests by private litigants in enforcement of civil rights
laws).
65 See, e.g., Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 574-76 (S.D. Iowa
1973) (applying Iowa law to invalidate solicitation and sale of securities in violation of
Iowa securities regulation law notwithstanding parties' express choice of New York law
to govern transaction).
6 See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 191-92.
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draw a neat distinction between the purportedly "real" and "spurious"
governmental interests of a state. Nor is it possible to limit a state's
"real interest" to laws implicating fiscal and proprietary concerns. To
recognize that there is a spectrum of governmental interests is more
accurate. The strength of a given governmental interest is not conclusively determined by whether that interest is being implemented by the
state itself or by private persons in the context of private litigation.
Depending on the nature of the particular rule of substantive law involved, a state may have as "real" an interest in having its law applied
in litigation between private persons as it does in a case in which the
state itself is a party.
Thus, the notion of governmental interests as a basis for resolving
choice-of-law problems is not, as Professor Juenger contends, "highly
implausible." State laws do indeed "wish to be applied" in litigation
between private persons when they reflect a strong policy and when
that policy will be advanced by the law's application in the particular
case. The state, therefore, can have a real interest in the outcome of
litigation between private persons. That interest involves the application of the state's law to implement the policy reflected in that law. It is
precisely because so many cases do present a conflict between laws reflecting strong policies of the involved states that courts make the
choice-of-law decision with reference to those policies, and that the forum is unwilling to displace its own law when it has a real interest in
applying that law to implement its policy. Professor Juenger simply is
wrong when he denies that states can have "real" interests in the application of their law in litigation between private persons.
In any event, the interest of the state in the application of its law to
implement the policy reflected in that law is not, in my view, the underlying premise of the interest analysis approach. 67 As Juenger has
noted, I agree that " 'a conflicts case admittedly does not involve a direct conflict between states in the same manner as a boundary dispute
or a dispute over spheres of interest.' "68 I also maintain that the premise of interest analysis is not that the purpose of conflicts law is to
advance a state's governmental interest. 69 Rather, the purpose of conUnlike some critics of interest analysis, Juenger does not ignore the subsequent
refinements of the interest analysis approach. Thus, Juenger is a "fair" critic. For that
reason, his criticism is entitled to an additional measure of respect. Compare New Critics, supra note 1,at 606-10.
61 Real and Spurious, supra note 54, at 530 (citing Governmental Interests, supra
note 1, at 191).
69New Critics, supra note 1, at 636-37 (emphasis in original).
67
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flicts law is to enable the court to reach a functionally sound and fair
result in the case before it. I maintain that the interest analysis approach in practice enables courts to reach such results in all the cases
coming before them for decision. For this reason, it is the preferred
approach to choice-of-law.

70

The underlying premise of interest analysis as an approach to
choice-of-law is that consideration of the policies and interests of the
involved states is the most rational and functionally sound method of
resolving the choice-of-law issues in private party litigation. Whatever
else Currie may have said, 71 he repeatedly justified interest analysis on
the ground that it provided a rational basis for making choice-of-law
decisions. 72 According to Currie, it is rational to make choice-of-law
decisions with reference to policies reflected in the laws of the involved
states, and to the interest of each state, in light of those policies, in
having its law applied on the point in issue in the particular case. Conversely, it is not rational to make choice-of-law decisions on a basis that
does not assign primary importance to policies reflected in rules of substantive law and the interest of states in having their laws applied to
implement those policies.
The rationalityjustification for interest analysis, as set forth above,
is not dependent on whether a state has a real interest in applying its
law to implement the policy reflected in that law. When the policy
behind a state's law would be advanced by its application in the particular case, the beneficiary of that law should be entitled to invoke such
benefit in the choice-of-law context. The court still is resolving a dispute between private persons rather than directly resolving a conflict
between the interests of the involved states. Thus, interest analysis is
not designed to turn, and does not have the effect of turning conflicts
into a "public law" matter. The focus still is on the private litigants
who are before the court and on the most rational way to resolve the
choice-of-law issues presented in the case.73
The rationality justification for the interest analysis approach thus
exists independently of the justification that states have real interests in
applying their law in litigation between private parties. As demonstrated above, in many cases the state has a real interest in applying its
See Preferred Approach, supra note 1, at 490-91.
For a discussion of my disagreement with Currie's overemphasis in places of the
interest of the state, see New Critics, supra note 1, at 637.
72 See, e.g., B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 107-21,
163-72, 178-84 (1963).
71 See New Critics, supra note 1, at 636-37.
70
71
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law for that reason. But even if such a real interest were absent, as
Professor Juenger contends (albeit erroneously), the rationality justification still would remain. Precisely because it is rational to make
choice-of-law decisions with reference to the policies and interests of the
involved states, the application of the interest analysis approach gener7
ally will produce functionally sound and fair results. 4
C.

The Lack of "Predictabilityand Consistency"

Professor Juenger's third essential criticism of interest analysis is
somewhat related to the first two and is more a matter of "comparative
utility." Juenger contends that interest analysis is a structurally unsound method of dealing with choice-of-law problems because it tries to
determine the personal and territorial reach of laws. Such a determination leads to overlap and gap, for which interest analysis cannot provide
acceptable and workable solutions. Second, Juenger contends that interest analysis proceeds on the incorrect premise that governments have
real interests in the application of substantive law to determine disputes
between private litigants. This being so, the application of the interest
analysis approach, in accordance with its underlying premises and
methodology, will not "guarantee predictability and consistency in the
adjudication of multistate disputes." While it may lead to functionally
sound and fair results in particular cases, it is not "programmed" to do
so. Since interest analysis then will not "guarantee predictability and
consistency," while according to Juenger the substantive law approach
will, the substantive law approach should be preferred over interest
75
analysis.
Interest analysis, says Juenger, will not guarantee predictability and
consistency. He believes that interest analysis accords far too much significance to the law of the parties' domiciles and in practice is a "thinly
disguised pretext for applying forum law. '76 According to Juenger, "In
almost all instances [Currie] deduces the legitimacy of an interest from
the fact that one of the parties is domiciled in the forum state, a conclusion he derived from the consideration that governments are primarily
concerned with the welfare of their citizens and residents. ' 77 Therefore,
U' For a further discussion of the rationality justification for interest analysis, see
Preferred Approach, supra note 1, at 489-91.
1sSee GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 321.
76 What Now?, supra note 21, at 516.
1 Juenger, Conflict of Laws: A Critique of InterestAnalysis, 32 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1,
9 (1984) [hereafter Critique].Juenger further states that Currie "resuscitated the medieval notion of a personal law, and his approach accords the domiciliary nexus a much
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interest analysis "amounts to little more than a complicated way of saying that the law of the domicile governs," 8 which cannot resolve
choice-of-law issues when the parties hail from different states. Since
Currie advocates application of the forum's law in both the true conflict
and the unprovided-for case, interest analysis becomes a "thinly disguised pretext for applying forum law."
What Juenger is saying is that under interest analysis, the law of the
parties' home state or "common domicile" applies when both parties
are from the same state, and the law of the forum applies when they
are from different states. Both propositions are incorrect under the interest analysis methodology, as developed by Currie and refined by his
followers, and under the application of interest analysis by the courts in
practice.
Under the interest analysis methodology, a state's interest in applying its law is determined with reference to the policy reflected in that
law and not on the state's connection with one or both of the parties to
the litigation. A particular connection with a state, such as a party resides there, will not necessarily give rise to an interest in applying a
particular rule of law in the circumstances of a particular case. A
state's interest in applying its law because of a party's residence in that
state will depend on the particular rule of law involved. In the ordinary
accident situation, the plaintiff's home state has a real interest79 in applying its law and allowing recovery. Such an interest exists because
the consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery
will be felt by the victim in that state. For the same reason, the defendant's home state has a real interest in applying its law and denying
recovery because the consequences of allowing or denying recovery will
be felt by the defendant and the insurer in that state.10 Conversely, in
the ordinary accident situation, when the plaintiff is from a
nonrecovery state, that state, based on its connection with the plaintiff,
has no interest in applying its law and denying recovery. When the
defendant is from a recovery state, that state has no interest, based on
its connection with the defendant, in applying its law and allowing
recovery.
more pervasive scope than it had ever enjoyed in Anglo-American jurisprudence." Id.
at 9-10. Even when Currie conceded some relevance to territorial contacts, as when a
nonresident was injured in the forum, "he attempted to rationalize this conclusion in
personal law terms by hypothesizing a governmental concern with local parties [such as
medical creditors] who may be indirectly affected by a transaction." Id. at 11.
78 Id. at 39.
,9 See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 222-27 (discussing real interests).
80Id. at 202.
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When a state's law reflects a people-protecting policy, such as enabling people to avoid contractual liability because of their legislativelydetermined incompetence to enter into certain kinds of contracts,"' that
state has a real interest in applying its law only when its resident is
sought to be held liable on such a contract. The people-protecting law
was indeed enacted for the benefit of that state's own residents. The
policy reflected in that law will be advanced only when its application
will enable a resident to avoid contractual liability."2 It would be presumptuous, however, for a state to purport to determine the competence
of residents of other states to enter into such contracts. In this circumstance then, the interest of a state in applying its law to implement the
policy reflected in that law is predicated entirely on its connection with
the party to be protected.
On the other hand, when a state's law reflects an admonitory or regulatory policy, its interest in applying its law to implement that policy
is not predicated on its connection with any party. Its interest is based
on its connection with the conduct sought to be deterred or the transaction sought to be regulated. Thus, the state where the conduct or transaction occurred will apply its admonitory or regulatory policy against
residents and nonresidents alike. The effect of the application of its law
may be to enable a nonresident party to prevail against a resident. 83
Juenger simply is incorrect when he says that interest analysis
''amounts to little more than a complicated way of saying that the law
of the domicile governs. 8'

4

Juenger says that interest analysis "works

well whenever the litigants are domiciled in the same state. Since, as a
rule, only that state has a legitimate interest in the controversy, a 'false
conflict' is presented." 8 Juenger is referring to the ordinary accident
situation in which both parties are from a recovery state and the acci81 See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 3-6, 395 P.2d 543, 544-45 (1964); Milliken
v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
82 In Lilienthal, the court applied the Oregon law of spendthrift immunity to enable

an Oregon spendthrift to avoid liability on a California-centered contract. Lilienthal,
239 Or. at 16, 395 P.2d at 549.
83 See, e.g., Lichter v. Fritsch, 77 Wis. 2d 178, 184-85, 252 N.W.2d 360, 363-64
(1977) (applying law of state of acting and imposing strict liability for harm caused by
leaving keys in car); Corrigan v. Bjork Shiley Corp., 182 Cal. App. 3d 166, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 247 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1049 (1987) (applying law of state of manu-

facture; imposing strict liability; allowing recovery of punitive damages for defectively
manufactured product); Intercontinental Planning, Ltd. v. Daystrom, Inc., 24 N.Y.2d
372, 379-86, 248 N.E.2d 576, 580-84 (1969) (invalidating statute of frauds rule of

state where significant negotiations leading to transaction occurred).
See Critique, supra note 77, at 39.
84

85 GENERAL COURSE,

supra note 4, at 217.
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dent occurred in a nonrecovery state. In such a case, the parties' home
state has a real interest in applying its law and allowing recovery because the social and economic consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery will be felt there. Meanwhile the state of
injury has no real interest in applying its law to enable a nonresident
defendant to avoid liability.8 6 Likewise, in the ordinary accident situation in which both parties are from a nonrecovery state and the accident occurs in a recovery state, I maintain that the false conflict is also
presented. In such a case, the parties's home state has a real interest in
applying its law to implement the defendant-protecting policy reflected
in that law. The state of injury, however, has no real interest in applying its law to enable a nonresident injured there to recover." The reason why the law of the parties' home state should apply in these situations, however, is not as Juenger suggests, that under interest analysis,
the law of the domicile "governs." The reason, as he recognizes, is that
here only the parties' home state has a real interest in having its law
applied to implement the policy reflected in that law.
Under interest analysis, the law of the parties' "common domicile"
would not apply when the matter in issue involves a law that reflects
an admonitory or regulatory policy. As stated above, in that circumstance a state's interest in applying its law to implement such a policy
depends on its connection with the conduct sought to be deterred or
with the activity sought to be regulated, and not on its connection with
any of the parties. When the law of the state where the conduct or
activity occurred imposes liability, that state has a real interest in applying its law in order to implement the admonitory or regulatory policy reflected in that law. Under interest analysis the state should do so.
Suppose that two spouses from a state that still retains the rule of
spousal immunity are involved in an altercation in a liability state, and
one spouse inflicts severe personal injuries on the other spouse. In
terms of interest analysis, this case presents the true conflict. The parties' home state has a real interest in applying its law to implement the
"anti-tort" policies reflected in its rule of spousal immunity. But the
state where the altercation occurred also has a real interest in applying
its own law in order to implement the admonitory policy reflected in its
See Judicial Method, supra note 11, at 1034.
See Sedler, Judicial Method Is "Alive and Well": The Kentucky Approach to
Choice-of-Law in Interstate Automobile Accidents, 61 Ky. L.J. 378, 382-83 (1973);
Sedler, Choice-of-Law in Michigan:JudicialMethod and the Policy-Centered Conflict
of Laws, 29 WAYNE L. REV. 1193, 1214-16 (1983). In practice, courts disagree on the
preferred result in this situation. See infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
86
87
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law, and should do so when suit is brought there.88
The point to be emphasized is that interest analysis is not, as
Juenger contends, premised on the assumption that the law of the domicile "governs" when the parties are from the same state. Nor for that
matter is it premised on the assumption, as Juenger also contends, that
a state enacts laws only for the benefit of its own residents.8 9 Depending on the policy reflected by a particular rule of law, a state's interest
in applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that
law may indeed be predicated on a party's residence in that state. Tort
rules imposing liability to implement compensatory policies or tort
rules protecting defendants from liability, and rules reflecting peopleprotecting policies fall into this category. A state's interest in applying
laws that reflect admonitory or regulatory policies, on the other hand,
is predicated on a state's connection with the conduct sought to be deterred or with the activity sought to be regulated, and has nothing to do
with a party's connection with the state.
Contrary to Professor Juenger's assertion, domicile does not have
overriding analytical or functional significance in interest analysis.
Rather, domicile is an important connecting factor in many cases because a state's interest in applying its substantive law is predicated on
the state's connection with the parties involved rather than with the
underlying transaction. And as emphasized above, a state's interest in
applying a particular rule of law in the circumstances of a particular
case depends not only on its connection with a party, but on the content
of the rule of substantive law. Again, in the ordinary accident situation,
the plaintiff's home state has no real interest in applying a rule of law
that denies liability while the defendant's home state has no real interest in applying a rule of law that imposes liability. It is not a state's
connection with a party that is relevant as such, but a state's interest in
applying its law in the circumstances of a particular case in order to
implement the policy reflected in that law.
We may turn now to Professor Juenger's contention that under interest analysis, the law of the forum applies whenever the parties are
from different states. In this circumstance, interest analysis is "a thinly
disguised pretext for applying forum law." Again, this proposition is
simply incorrect. First, in the false conflict situation in which the parties are from different states and the forum is the "disinterested state,"
88See Sedler, Characterization,Identification of the Problem Area, and the PolicyCentered Conflict of Laws: An Exercise in Judicial Method, 2 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 8, 6768 (1970).
89 See GENERAL

COURSE,

supra note 4, at 216.
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the forum should displace its law in favor of the law of the other state.
One example of the forum as the "disinterested state" occurs when the
law of the defendant's home state reflects an admonitory policy, the
defendant acted in the home state, and the action caused harm to the
plaintiff in the plaintiff's home state, the law of which does not impose
liability. If the plaintiff sues in the plaintiff's home state, that state will
apply the law of the defendant's home state. The plaintiff's home state
has no real interest in applying its own law while the defendant's home
state has such an interest. 90
Another example of the forum as the "disinterested state" occurs in
regard to the tort liability of an employer to an employee who is covered by worker's compensation. Courts agree that the tort liability of
the employer should be determined by the law of the state where the
employer has taken out worker's compensation to cover the particular
employee. This is so even when under the law of the employee's home
state, the employee is entitled to maintain a tort action against the employer and suit is brought in that state. 91 As these examples indicate, in
the false conflict situation, when the parties are from different states
and the forum is the "disinterested state," interest analysis dictates that
the forum displace its own law. 92
90See, e.g., Gravina v. Brunswick Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.I. 1972). A Rhode
Island plaintiff brought suit in a Rhode Island federal court to recover for invasion of
privacy resulting from the unauthorized use of her name and photograph in an advertising flyer. The defendant had its principal place of business in Illinois, and the flyer
was sent from there. The federal court assumed that Rhode Island law would not allow
recovery. The court held that since Illinois law allowed recovery, Illinois had a real
interest in applying its law to implement the admonitory policy reflected in that law.
Id. at 3-7; see also Acme Circus Operating Co. v. Kuperstock, 711 F.2d 1538 (11th
Cir. 1983). In Acme Circus, a right of publicity was infringed by a Florida enterprise
in Florida, causing injury to the California holder of the right in California. Applying
California conflicts law, the court held that California would look to Florida law and
imposed liability for such infringement. Id. at 1545-46.
91 See SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES: APPLYING THE CONFLICT OF LAWS TO
YOUR PRACTICE 62 nn.33 & 34, 63 n.35 (1989) [hereafter ACROSS STATE LINES]
(reviewing cases). The law of the state where the employer has acquired worker's compensation insurance to cover the particular employee also applies to determine whether
the injured employee can maintain a tort action against a coemployee for a work-related injury and to determine questions of contribution in the case of third-party liability to the employee. In effect, courts have agreed that only one state has a real interest
in applying its law on the point in issue, and where the employer has taken out
worker's compensation insurance covering the particular employee in another state, the
forum will displace its own law. For an illustrative case where the forum displaced its
own law in this situation, see Wilson v. Faull, 27 N.J. 105, 141 A.2d 768 (1958).
92 See also Denny v. American Tobacco Co., 308 F. Supp. 219 (N.D. Cal. 1970). A
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In the true conflict situation, Currie maintained that the forum
should apply its own law to implement the policy reflected in that law.
I agree fully with forum preference as the proper means of resolution
of the true conflict. 93 Subsequently, I will compare the forum preference solution to the true conflict situation with Professor Juenger's
"better law" solution. At this juncture, it is sufficient to point out that
there is nothing "disguised" about Currie's forum preference solution
to the true conflict. Currie advocated forum preference as the only
proper means of resolving the true conflict and not as a "disguised"
preference for the forum's own law.
In the unprovided-for case, the parties are from different states. By
definition neither of the involved states has a real interest in having its
law applied to implement the policy reflected in that law. This type of
case analytically presents the most difficulty for the interest analysis
approach. Interest analysis can identify the unprovided-for case, but it
cannot provide a means for its resolution. That is, the choice-of-law
decision must be based on considerations other than the policies reflected in the laws of the involved states and the interest of each state in
applying its law to implement those policies. The unprovided-for case
arises with more frequency than Currie anticipated. As might be expected, it is the unprovided-for case that has given courts the most diffi94
culty in practice.
Currie did suggest that application of the forum's law was an appropriate way of resolving the unprovided-for case. In fact, some courts
have adopted this solution.95 I have maintained that an appropriate way
of resolving the unprovided-for case is to look to the common policy of
the involved states. Often the point as to which the laws of the involved
states differ will involve a substantive rule that is an exception to the
common policy reflected in the law of both states. Examples of exceptions to the common policy would include the traditional "anti-tort"
immunities, such as guest statute immunity or spousal immunity, and
California resident solicited a finder's fee by sending a letter to an officer of a New
York-based corporation. The letter advised the officer that a California-based company
might be for sale. The defendant did not reply, but eventually acquired the company.
The plaintiff sued in California. The plaintiff alleged that under California law he was
entitled to recover reasonable compensation if the defendant took advantage of the
"tip." Under the New York statute of frauds, the defendant would not be liable. The
court held that New York law applied on the issue of the statute of frauds. Id. at 223.
91See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 227-33.
94 See Interstate Accidents, supra note 11, at 137-42.
95 See, e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 264 Or. 454, 458, 506 P.2d 494, 496 (1973) (applying law of forum).
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limitations on wrongful death recovery. Since the state whose law provides an exception to the common policy has no interest in having its
law applied in the circumstances of the particular case, the common
policy should be applied.
For example, if the plaintiff was from a state with a guest statute
and the defendant was from a liability state, the guest statute exception
to liability should not be recognized. 96 Going further, I would say that
whenever the defendant comes from a liability state, the defendant generally should be held liable irrespective of where the plaintiff resides or
where the accident occurs. The defendant would have expected to have
been held liable in accordance with the law of the defendant's home
state at the time the defendant undertook the act in question or insured
against liability.
As a practical matter, in the unprovided-for case in which the plaintiff's home state has an exception to liability, the plaintiff is likely to
bring suit in the defendant's home state. The plaintiff should do this
both when the accident occurs there and when it occurs in the plaintiffs home state, on the quite realistic assumption that it is easier to
persuade a court to apply its own law than to apply the law of another
state. In practice, the majority of courts addressing the question have
allowed recovery, emphasizing that the defendant's home state imposes
liability. Some, however, have denied recovery, emphasizing that the
law of the plaintiff's home state did not allow recovery. 97 In any event,
under my view, the law of the defendant's home state that imposes liability generally should apply in the unprovided-for case. Since the
plaintiff is likely to sue in that state, in practice there will be a coincidence of the law of the forum and the law of the defendant's home
state. But, under my view, the unprovided-for case should be resolved
in accordance with the law of the defendant's home state, not the law of
the forum. The same result should be reached in the unlikely event that
the plaintiff brings the suit in the plaintiff's home state.
My point is that Juenger simply is incorrect when he says that when
the parties are from different states, interest analysis is a "thinly disguised pretext for applying forum law." Under interest analysis, at
least as I have reformulated it, the law of the forum qua forum is to be
applied only to resolve true conflicts. In the false conflict situation, the
applicable law is the law of the only interested state, whether this is the
forum or another state. This is so whether both parties are residents of
the same state or are residents of different states. In the unprovided-for
96

See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 233-36.

" For a review of these cases, see

ACROSS STATE LINES, supra note 91, at 57-58.
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case, the applicable law is that of the defendant's home state. At the
time the defendant undertook the act in question or insured against
liability the defendant could anticipate the application of this law.
As the above discussion clarifies, interest analysis, again at least as I
have reformulated it, is neither conceptually nor operationally difficult.
In fact, it is an extremely simple methodology. There are three propositions under my reformulation.98 First, when the forum has a real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy reflected
in that law, 99 it should do so.' °° Second, when the forum does not have
a real interest in applying its own law in order to implement the policy
reflected in that law, but the other involved state does have such an
interest,' 0 the forum should apply the law of the other state. Third, in
the unprovided-for case, in which neither state has a real interest in
applying its law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law,
the generally applicable law should be the law of the defendant's home
state. 102

I have maintained that interest analysis is the preferred approach to
choice-of-law because it works.'°3 More than any other approach to
choice-of-law, interest analysis facilitates the court's role in a conflicts
case because it provides functionally sound and fair solutions to the
choice-of-law issues. t° The interest analysis accomplishes this task by
focusing on what courts consider to be the most rational consideration
in making choice-of-law decisions: the policies reflected in a state's substantive law and a state's interest in applying its law to implement
98See Governmental Interests, supra note 1, at 220-21.

9 In Currie's terms, this covers both the true conflict and the false conflict where the
forum is the only interested state.
100This assumes, of course, that the application of the forum's law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party. As I have emphasized many times, fairness to the parties
is an independent choice-of-law consideration. The forum will not, and constitutionally
cannot, apply its own law, despite a real interest in doing so, when the application of
its law would be fundamentally unfair to the other party. See New Critics, supra note
1, at 611-15.
101In Currie's terms, this is the false conflict brought in the disinterested state.
102 This results from looking to the common policy reflected in other laws of the
involved states, which usually will lead to the application of the law of the defendant's
home state, or from looking directly to the law of the defendant's home state, since the
application of that law could have been anticipated by the defendant at the time the
defendant undertook the action in question or insured against liability.
103 See New Critics, supra note 1, at 635-43.
104 By functionally sound and fair results, I mean results that are acceptable in that
they do not produce unfairness to the litigants and do not require the application of the
law of a state in circumstances in which the application of such law would be considered objectively unreasonable. Id. at 639.
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those policies. I also have demonstrated that courts which have abandoned the traditional approach generally employ interest analysis to resolve choice-of-law issues regardless of which "modern approach" to
choice-of-law they are purportedly following. 05 Professor Juenger does
not dispute this point, and no one else seriously controverts it. Finally,
I have contended that if courts in fact are applying interest analysis,
and if courts are reaching functionally sound and fair results, then the
validity of interest analysis as a basic approach to choice-of-law has
been empirically demonstrated. 0 6 Again, -Professor Juenger does not
dispute this point.
Professor Juenger fully agrees with my contention that "in the 'real
world" interest analysis does work and generally will produce functionally sound and fair results."'01 7 But Juenger contends this is not because
interest analysis is methodologically or operationally sound. 108 Rather,
interest analysis has worked in practice because it has enabled the forum to apply its own law in tort cases. Thereby the forum avoids the
application of the substandard tort law of the other involved state. In
essence, Juenger believes that interest analysis produces functionally
sound and fair results only because it enables the forum to apply its
own "better law."
II.

THE CRUX OF THE CHALLENGE: INTEREST ANALYSIS VERSUS
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW APPROACH

We now come to the crux of Professor Juenger's challenge to interest
analysis. Essentially, Juenger's criticism of interest analysis is based on
his strong advocacy of a substantive law or "result-selective" approach
to choice-of-law. 0 9 Such an approach, contends Juenger,'not only will
guarantee the predictability and consistency that interest analysis lacks,
but will produce better results in particular cases. This is because the
substantive law approach will result in the application of the substantive law that better "respond[s] to interstate and international
realities."110
Juenger's advocacy of the result-selective approach is related to his
1o5
See supra note 2.
See New Critics, supra note 1, at 638.
107What Now?, supra note 21, at 513.
108 Id. at 514-16.
109Professor Juenger repeatedly decries the acceptance of interest analysis by academic commentators and courts. See, e.g., id. at 516-17; Critique, supra note 77, at 8,
14.
It0GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 268.
106
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view of the function of a court in a conflicts case and the purpose of
conflicts law in our legal system. Juenger's view of the court's function
and of the purpose of conflicts law is quite grandiose. In a conflicts
case, the judge is "compelled to act as a multistate decision-maker, for
his judgment will affect relationships that, by definition, are not confined to his own territory and law.""' Thus, judges in conflicts cases
should act in the tradition of the Roman praetor peregrinus. They
should "go to the heart of the matter and devise substantive solutions
responsive to the exigencies of the multistate transactions with which
they are confronted.""' 2 If courts will "identify those rules of decision
that are appropriate for multistate transactions,""' 3 then it may be
hoped that "a new ius commune will evolve, composed of precepts
whose merits have been judicially certified." ' 1 4 Further, there is no
danger that judges will always find the law of the forum to be the
"better law," since they do not lack the ability to "question the wisdom
of established law.""' 5 Thus, concludes Juenger, "The conscious efforts
of judges to adjudicate multistate disputes by applying rules that, in
their opinion, are of superior quality ought to assure a greater number
of sound decisions than any other doctrine could conceivably
produce."" 16

The essential, difference between interest analysis and Juenger's substantive law approach relates to a fundamental disagreement over the
proper function of a court in a conflicts case and to the purpose of
conflicts law in our legal system. Juenger says that the function of a
court and the purpose of conflicts law is to "devise substantive solutions
responsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions." This means, according to Juenger, solutions that result in the application of "rules of
superior quality." He has no doubt that judges can determine what
rules are "superior," or that they will apply the "superior" rules
whether they are those of the forum or the other state.
Under interest analysis, in contrast, the proper function of a court in
a conflicts case simply is to achieve a functionally sound and fair result
M Id. at 265.
112
113

Id.
Id. at 287-88.

114 Id.

at 288.

What Now?, supra note 21, at 522.
116 GENERAL COURSE, supra note 4, at 288. A valuable by-product of the substantive law approach, says Juenger, is that judicial opinions on the merits of the competing
rules will result. Thus, "By signalling deficiencies in foreign and domestic law, teleology supplies an important incentive for scholars, legislatures and courts to ponder the
need for reform." Id. at 287.
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in the particular case before it. The purpose of conflicts law is to facilitate the court's achievement of such a result. Interest analysis does not
look for "substantive solutions that respond to the exigencies of multistate transactions," and it does not try to identify the "better law."
Rather it proceeds on the premise that the most rational way to achieve
functionally sound and fair results in conflicts cases is to focus on the
policies reflected in the laws of the involved states and the interest of
each state in applying its law to implement those policies.
There is no objective way by which this fundamental disagreement
over the function of a court in a conflicts case and over the purpose of
conflicts law can be resolved. What we can do, however, is to learn
something from the behavior of courts in actual cases. In looking at
what courts do in practice, it becomes clear that they do not see their
function in the grandiose way that Professor Juenger does. Rather they
see their function as reaching functionally sound and fair results in the
particular cases coming before them for decision. Courts apparently believe that such results are achieved by making the choice-of-law decision primarily with reference to the policies and interests of the involved states. This is why judicial decisions generally are consistent
with interest analysis results, including the application of the forum's
own law in the true conflict situation.
Interest analysis sometimes leads to a court's resolution of the conflict
by applying the "worse" law in stark contrast to Juenger's substantive
law approach. Juenger says that the court should apply the "better
law," whether it be that of the forum or the other involved state. The
practice of American courts, however, indicates that (1) the forum will
apply its own "worse" law when it has a real interest in implementing
the legislative or judicial policy; and (2) whenever the forum applies
the "better law," that law, not coincidentally, is its own.
Juenger points to the "better law" consideration under Leflar's
choice-influencing considerations approach as an example of the substantive law approach.. Juenger's observations on this choice-influencing consideration in practice are more revealing than he perhaps realizes. He states: "Courts that have adopted Leflar's choice-influencing
considerations have experienced little difficulty in deciding multistate
disputes justly and predictably, except in those few cases where judges
thought that the forum's governmental interests required application
of substandardforum law.""' 7 He uses Maguire v. Exeter & Hampton
Electric Co. to illustrate the latter situation."18 Maguire also is the case
"' Id. at 275 (emphasis added).
"'

114 N.H. 589, 325 A.2d 778 (1974).
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that I use to demonstrate that under Leflar's approach, the "advancement of the forum's governmental interests" consideration' 19 takes precedence over the "better law" consideration. In that case, a Maine resident temporarily was employed in New Hampshire by a New
Hampshire employer and was killed in an accident there. The wrongful death action was brought against the employer in New Hampshire,
the only state where it was subject to jurisdiction. At that time, New
Hampshire law limited liability in wrongful death to $50,000. Maine
law had no such limitation. While conceding that the Maine rule of
unlimited recovery was the "better rule," the New Hampshire court
nonetheless applied New Hampshire law. After all, New Hampshire's
law advanced the forum's real interest in protecting the New Hampshire employer from unlimited liability.
The New Hampshire court failed to seize the opportunity to displace
its own law in favor of the admittedly "better law" of Maine. The
reason, I submit, is the result of the court's view of the proper function
of a court in a conflicts case. The court tried to achieve a functionally
sound and fair result in the case before it. When the forum has a real
interest in implementing the policy reflected in its own law and the
120
application of its law is not fundamentally unfair to the other party,
the court finds .it
reasonable to apply the forum's law to advance the
forum's interest. Courts tend to see a conflicts case essentially as a domestic case with an added foreign element. When the same reasons that
call for the application of the forum's law in a domestic case are
equally present in a conflicts case, courts consider it reasonable to apply
their own law. Again, unlike Professor Juenger, they do not view their
function in a conflicts case as being to "devise multistate solutions re119 Leflar defines this choice-influencing consideration in terms of the forum's "total

governmental interests," and not merely its interest in applying its own law to implement the policy reflected in that law. Leflar asserts that a state's total governmental
interest is to be ascertained from the considerations that properly motivate a state in its
lawmaking and law-administering tasks. He further states that the interest is not synonymous with the application of its substantive law. In certain circumstances, such as
when a state's substantive law is "archaic," its total governmental interest may dictate
that its law not be applied. See Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing
Considerations,54 CALIF. L. REV. 1584, 1587-88 (1966). In practice, however, courts
following Leflar's approach apply this choice-influencing with reference to the forum's
interest in applying its own law to implement the policy reflected in that law, in accordance with the interest analysis approach. Courts do not refer to the forum's total
governmental interest, as Leflar has defined that concept. See ACROSS STATE LINES,
supra note 91, at 42-43.
120 See supra note 100 (discussing fairness to parties as independent choice-of-law
consideration).
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sponsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions.' '1 21
By the same token, when a forum resident is injured by a nonresident party in that party's home state, it also is reasonable for the forum
to apply its own law. Of course, this determination assumes that the
application of its law will not be fundamentally unfair to the other
party. Consider the Minnesota case of Schwartz v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp. 122 Minnesota, like New Hampshire, expressly follows Leflar's choice-influencing considerations. In Schwartz, a Minnesota resident was involved in an accident with an interstate trucking
company in Ohio. The company had its principal place of business in
Ohio. The plaintiff brought suit in Minnesota. The Ohio company was
subject to jurisdiction on the basis of forum-defendant contacts. Under
Ohio law, contributory negligence would bar plaintiff's recovery. Minnesota law, however, allowed recovery based on comparative negligence. The, application of Minnesota law would produce no unfairness
to the defendant since the defendant's driver did not rely on the Ohio
contributory negligence rule before becoming involved in the accident
there. Since Minnesota had a real interest in applying its law to implement the policy reflected in that law, and since the application of its
law produced no unfairness to the Ohio defendant, the forum's application of its own law was reasonable, and so it did so. 12 3
The results in Maguire and Schwartz are consistent with interest
analysis. In both cases the forum applied its own law in the true conflict situation. They are inconsistent, however, with the "better law"
concept that is at the heart of Juenger's substantive law approach.
When a court has a real interest in applying its own law to implement
the policy reflected in that law, it simply does not consider it reasonable
to displace its own law in favor of the "better law" of the other involved state. This is why the New Hampshire court in Maguire
"thought that the forum's governmental interests required application
of substandard forum law." Again, courts do not view their function in
a conflicts case as being to "devise substantive solutions responsive to
the exigencies of multistate transactions." Instead, they see their function as reaching a functionally sound and fair result in the case before
it. They believe that they achieve this objective by applying the forum's
law in a case in which the forum has a real interest in having that law
applied.
When the forum has no real interest in applying its law, courts fol21 GENERAL

COURSE,

supra note 4, at 265.

122 300 Minn. 487, 221 N.W.2d 665 (1974).
123 Id. at 493-94, 221 N.W.2d at 669.
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lowing Leflar's approach sometimes rely on the "better law" consideration to justify the application of the forum's "better law." This has
occurred when suit is brought in a recovery state regarding an accident
in that state and involving parties both of whom are from a
nonrecovery state. 2 4 As I have emphasized, in this situation the state of
injury has no real interest in applying its law and allowing recovery.
The consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery
will be felt by the parties in their home state. 2 Thus, in this situation
the "better law" consideration leads to the application of the forum's
"better law" when the forum has no real interest in applying its own
law. 2 6 But when the forum does have a real interest in applying its
own law in order to implement the policy reflected in that law, as in
Maguire, the "better law" consideration is subordinate to the forum's
governmental interests. In practice, the operation of Leflar's choice-influencing considerations approach simply has meant the application of
the forum's own law, whether "better" or "worse." Juenger rather conveniently ignores this point. 27 Again, when the forum applies the "bet28
ter law," that law, not coincidentally, has been its own.
124 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 295 Minn. 155, 203 N.W.2d 408 (1973); Gagne v.
Berry, 112 N.H. 125, 290 A.2d 624 (1972); Conklin v. Homer, 38 Wis. 2d 468, 157
N.W.2d 579 (1968). The out-of-state plaintiff always will bring suit in the recovery
state under the "long-arm" act. If plaintiff brings suit in the home state, that state will
apply its law and deny recovery. See, e.g., Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa
1968); McSwain v. McSwain, 420 Pa. 86, 215 A.2d 677 (1966); Tower v. Schwabe,
284 Or. 105, 585 P.2d 662 (1978).
125 See supra note 87.
126 For cases in which the forum refused to apply its own law in this circumstance
and applied the nonrecovery rule of the parties' home state, see Vick v. Cochran, 316
So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1975); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480
N.E.2d 679 (1985); Mager v. Mager, 197 N.W.2d 626 (N.D. 1972).
127 If Juenger says that interest analysis is a "thinly disguised pretext for applying
forum law," what would Juenger say about Leflar's choice-influencing considerations?
128 See Bigelow v. Halloran, 313 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1981). The court followed Leflar's choice-influencing considerations and displaced its own "worse" law. The court
displaced its law to enable an Iowa victim of an intentional tort committed by a Minnesota defendant in Iowa to recover against the defendant's estate. It held that Iowa's rule
permitting survival of intentional tort causes of action was "better" than Minnesota's
abatement rule. Id. at 12. The next year, however, when faced with the application of
Minnesota's abatement rule in a purely domestic case, the Minnesota court found that
its abatement rule violated the equal protection clause of the state constitution. Thompson v. Estate of Petroff, 319 N.W.2d 400, 406-07 (Minn. 1982). Thus, in retrospect
Bigelow was a "no-conflict" case.
Likewise, in Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d
721, 148 Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), the California court assumed that California law recognized tort liability for the loss of a "key employee." Id. at 163, 583 P.2d at 274, 148
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The problem with Juenger's substantive law approach is that courts
will not use it to displace the forum's substantive law when the forum
has a real interest in applying its law. Some courts probably would
seize on its result-selectivity as an excuse, as they seize on Leflar's
"better law" consideration as an excuse, to apply the forum's "better
law." Whatever else the substantive law approach may accomplish, it
surely will not "guarantee consistency in the adjudication of multistate
disputes"' 129 as Professor Juenger asserts. Indeed, it only will encourage
plaintiffs to sue in the state with the "better law." Plaintiffs will hope
that the forum will decide to prefer its "better law" at the expense of
the real interests of the parties' home state. Simply put, the substantive
law approach will lead to the "forum shopping" that Juenger purportedly deplores.
Even if courts will not "devise substantive solutions responsive to the
exigencies of multistate transactions," the question still remains
whether courts, as Juenger contends, should do so. Here, I will meet
Juenger on his own terms and assert that courts should not do so. It is
not their function to "police the multistate order." Their only purpose
is to reach a functionally sound and fair result in the cases coming
before them for decision. They will not reach such results by deciding
what law is the "better law" since they have no objective standards by
which to make such a determination. Even if they did, a court should
not refuse to recognize a constitutionally permissible legislative policy
choice simply because the court disagrees with that policy choice.
Under the constitution of every American state, legislation takes precedence over common law rules. A court must apply constitutional legislation whether or not it considers the policy embodied in the legislation "substandard." The same considerations that justify the
application of the law in a domestic case, implementing legislative polCal. Rptr. at 870. The court held that in the true conflict situation, California law

would be "less impaired" than the law of Louisiana where the defendant resided and
the accident occurred. Id. at 169, 583 P.2d at 729, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 875. Offshore thus
was another example in which the forum seemingly displaced its own law in the true

conflict situation. Offshore, however, also turned out to be a "no conflict case." The
California court subsequently held that California law did not recognize this "aberra-

tional" kind of tort liability. I.J. Weinrot & Son v. Jackson, 40 Cal. 3d 327, 335, 708
P.2d 682, 686, 220 Cal. Rptr. 103, 108 (1985). The retrospective "no conflict" thus

cannot be counted as an instance where the forum displaced its own "worse law" in the
true conflict situation. In practice, in the true conflict situation, no case can be found

where the forum displaced its own "worse law."
129 GENERAL COURSE,

supra note

4,

at 257.
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icy, justifies its application in the conflicts case. 130 Thus, when the application of the forum law advances the policy reflected in that law in a
conflicts case in the same manner as in a domestic case, it does not seem
rational or appropriate for the court to displace its own law on the
ground that the law of the other state is the "better law.'' By the
same token, when the forum does not have a real interest in applying
its own law to implement the policy reflected in that law, but the other
involved state does have such an interest, the forum should not refuse to
recognize the validity of the other state's policy choice.
The patent unsoundness of courts trying to "devise substantive solutions responsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions" clearly is
demonstrated by Professor Juenger's proposed "substantive solutions"
to product liability and "mass disaster" cases. 32 Juenger proposes an
alternative reference solution that identifies the connecting factors and
that sets forth a criterion for selection among the potentially applicable
laws. Under this criterion, the applicable law in products liability cases
would be with respect to each issue "that rule of decision which most
closely accords with modern standards of products liability,"'' 3 and in
130 See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 239 Or. 1, 395 P.2d 543 (1964). The court held that
an Oregon law enabling "spendthrifts" to avoid contracts should be applied to enable
an Oregon defendant to avoid a contract centered in California with a California defendant. Id. at 15-16, 395 P.2d at 549. The court noted that: "Courts are instruments
of state policy. The Oregon Legislature has adopted a policy to avoid . . . possible
expenditure of Oregon public funds which might occur if the spendthrift is required to
pay his obligations. In litigation Oregon courts are the appropriate instrument to enforce this policy." Id. at 15, 395 P.2d at 549. In that case, plaintiff argued that the
Oregon court should "devise substantive solutions responsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions." Specifically, plaintiff argued that commercial considerations dictated
the displacement of Oregon law so that out-of-state parties would not avoid commercial
dealings with Oregonians. Id. at 14, 395 P.2d at 545. In rejecting this argument, the
court stated: "The substance of these commercial considerations, however, is deflated by
the recollection that the Oregon Legislature has determined, despite the weight of these
considerations, that a spendthrift's contracts are voidable." Id. at 15, 395 P.2d at 549.
"3 I am not saying that it would be "constitutionally or politically" improper for the
court to refuse to apply the forum's law in such a situation. See New Critics, supra
note 1, at 637. Rather, a court is unwilling to displace the forum's own law where
application would advance the policy reflected in that law. It does not seem rational for
a court to displace its own law in that circumstance. The application of the forum's law
in that circumstance seems objectively reasonable.
If the conflict is brought about by a common law rule of the forum that is concededly
the "worse law," the forum can avoid the conflict simply by changing its own common
law rule. The California court effectively did this "retroactively" in Offshore. See supra
note 128.
132See supra notes 45, 46 and accompanying text.
133 See supra note 46.
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"mass disaster" cases, with respect to each issue simply "the most suita134
ble rule of decision."
The most obvious difficulty with Professor Juenger's substantive law
approach in both contexts is the lack of objective standards - or for
that matter, any standards whatsoever - by which the court can determine which rule of substantive law meets Professor Juenger's stated
criterion for selection. How is it remotely possible to determine which
"rule of decision most closely accords with modern standards of products liability," or in a "mass disaster" case, what is the "most suitable
rule of decision?" Products liability law is in a state of extreme flux,
with disagreement among courts over many fundamental issues. This
disagreement ranges all the way from the underlying basis for imposing
liability for defectively made products to the appropriateness of an
award of punitive damages. The matter of the "most suitable rule of
decision" in "mass disaster" cases is utterly impossible to define. Dramatic changes in substantive tort law have occurred in the last few
years. State after state has enacted various forms of "tort reform" legislation, all designed to limit enterprise tort liability and to reduce the
amount of recovery, especially for noneconomic loss.
Professor Juenger has argued that "substandard tort law" should not
be applied in multistate cases. His definition of "substandard tort law"
is built around the largely abandoned defendant-favoring rules, such as
guest statute and spousal immunity or limitations on wrongful death
recovery. When referring to the "most suitable rule of decision," he
obviously has in mind the conventional plaintiff-favoring rules, such as
liability for ordinary negligence in all circumstances, comparative negligence as opposed to contributory negligence, and unlimited recovery for
wrongful death. He simply has not taken account of the "tort revolution" reflected in modern "tort reform" legislation. The current trend
in tort law is no longer "recovery with loss distribution through the
tortfeasor's liability insurance.'

13

The trend is limitation or even denial

of recovery, designed to protect defendants and insurers from what legislatures consider to be excessive liability for enterprise activity. The
discredited defendant-favoring immunities and limitations on wrongful
death recovery have been replaced by caps on recovery, and above all,
by limitations on recovery for noneconomic loss. The debate over "tort
reform" continues in many states. When a legislature adopts a defendant-favoring "tort reform" rule, it has made an important policy choice.
The legislature presumably wants their choice implemented in any
134Id.
135R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws

359 (3d ed. 1986).
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case, domestic or multistate, in which a forum enterprise is involved as
a defendant.
Today, therefore, it is impossible to determine objectively or even at
all, whether a rule of products liability "most closely accords with modern standards." States strongly disagree over what those standards
should be. Likewise, what rules of substantive tort law constitute the
"most suitable rule of decision" is impossible to determine. Again the
states strongly disagree over what is the "most suitable rule of decision." Moreover, the substantive rules of products liability and of tort
law that have emerged from the "tort reform revolution" reflect current
and strongly-held policies of the involved states. That a court would or
should make a "qualitative evaluation" of these rules, as Professor
Juenger purportedly would have them do, simply is impossible to
believe.
I will use two hypothetical examples to illustrate why the substantive
law approach advocated by Juenger is incapable of application. The
hypotheticals also demonstrate why the interest analysis approach will
produce functionally sound and fair results.136 In the products liability
context, the manufacturer manufactures the product in New York and
puts it into national distribution. The plaintiff, a resident of California,
purchases the product in her home state. She is injured, allegedly due
to a design defect in the product. The plaintiff sues the manufacturer in
California, where it is doing business. Under New York products liability law, for all practical purposes a manufacturer can be held liable
on a design defect claim only on the basis of negligence. The plaintiff
must prove that the product was defective, and if the product conformed to the state-of-the-art at the time of manufacture, the manufacturer is relieved from liability. Under California law, however, if the
plaintiff demonstrates that an alleged design defect is the cause of the
injury, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the product was
not defective under risk-utility guidelines. 3 7 That the California rule is
extremely favorable to plaintiffs and effectively imposes strict liability
for design defects is widely acknowledged.
In terms of interest analysis, of course, this case presents the true
conflict. California has a real interest in applying its plaintiff-favoring
rule for the benefit of the California plaintiff injured there. Conversely,
These examples are taken from Sedler & Twerski, The Case Against All Encompassing Federal Mass Tort Legislation: Sacrifice Without Gain, 73 MARQ. L. REV.
(1990) (forthcoming).
137 Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431-32, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
136
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New York has a real interest in applying its manufacturer-protecting
rule for the benefit of the New York manufacturer who manufactured
the product there. In this case of true conflict, California would apply
138
its own law and allow recovery.
Now let us consider how this case would be resolved under Juenger's
substantive law approach. California law could be selected because the
plaintiff resides there, the product was acquired there, and the injury
occurred there. Likewise New York law could be selected because the
defendant has its principal place of business there, and the product was
manufactured there. Which law "most closely accords with modern
standards of products liability?" Is it New York law because practically
all other states take New York's approach to liability for design defects? Or, is it California's law because California law is on the "cutting edge" and enables the tort victim to recover, a result that Professor
Juenger seems to favor? Here, of course, there is no clearly "substandard tort law" to be rejected in multistate cases, and there is no objective way or any other way by which a court can determine whether the
California law or the New York law "most closely accords with modern standards of products liability." Carrying Juenger's substantive law
approach to its logical conclusion, the court simply may have to decide
whether it wants to favor plaintiffs or manufacturers. This approach
hardly seems a proper way to go about "devising substantive solutions
responsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions."
In any event, the California court has fashioned what it believes to
be an appropriate substantive rule for design defect products cases. As
the forum, California will apply that rule in this case because the policy reflected in the rule will be advanced by such application. The result functionally is sound and fair to the parties. California has a real
interest in applying its law to enable the California plaintiff to recover.
The consequences of the accident and of allowing or denying recovery
will be felt by the plaintiff in California. The application of California
law to this issue in this case was fully foreseeable to the New York
manufacturer, who shipped the product into California. In this case,
therefore, interest analysis produces a functionally sound and fair result. Juenger's substantive law approach, however, is incapable of providing any solution at all to the question of which state's law should
138 The case will not arise in New York, because the plaintiff obviously will sue in
California. This is not "forum-shopping," but more appropriately a legitimate "forumselection." California can exercise jurisdiction on the basis of both forum-defendant and
forum-transaction contacts and can constitutionally apply its own substantive law.
Therefore, the plaintiff has brought the suit in a "proper forum."
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apply.
The second example is a hypothetical "mass disaster" in which an
accident involves a large number of victims. Fifty members of the Elks
Club of Denver, Colorado, charter a bus for a trip to Arizona for an
Elks Convention. The bus company, Colorado Coaches, Inc. is a Colorado corporation doing business mostly within the state. In Phoenix,
thirty Arizona Elks members get on the bus for a local sightseeing trip.
Due to the negligence of the driver, the bus hits a culvert, causing the
bus to overturn. All the passengers suffer serious and debilitating injuries. A Colorado statute adopted in 1987139 limits recovery for
noneconomic loss for ordinary negligence to $250,000 for each plaintiff.
Arizona law has no such limitation. Both the Arizona and Colorado
plaintiffs bring suit against Colorado Coaches in Arizona to recover for
their personal injuries.
Under interest analysis, the result in both cases is easy. The suit by
the Arizona plaintiffs presents a true conflict: Arizona has a real interest in applying its law to allow unlimited recovery for noneconomic loss
to the Arizona plaintiffs, while Colorado has a real interest in applying
its law to limit the liability of the Colorado defendant. The application
of Arizona law to allow unlimited recovery produces a functionally
sound and fair result. Arizona has a real interest in applying its law for
the benefit of the Arizona plaintiffs, and the Colorado defendant could
foresee the application of Arizona law when it operated the bus in that
state. The suit by the Colorado plaintiffs against the Colorado defendant, however, presents a false conflict. Colorado has a real interest in
applying its law to limit the liability of the Colorado defendant. However, Arizona has no real interest in applying its law to allow recovery
to the Colorado plaintiffs, since the consequences of the accident and of
allowing or denying recovery will be felt by the plaintiffs in Colorado.
The application of interest analysis produces "inconsistent results."
The Arizona plaintiffs and the Colorado plaintiffs, injured in the same
bus accident, obtain different measures of recovery. This, however, is
because the parties' home states have different rules as to the amount of
damages recoverable. The consequences of the accident and of imposing
or denying liability will be felt by the parties in the states in which
they reside. In this circumstance, to limit each victim to the measure of
recovery afforded by the law of the victim's home state is fully
reasonable.140
139

COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-21-102.5(3) (Supp. 1987).

Juenger believes that it is "unfair" to subject the claims of different victims of the
same "mass disaster" to different substantive laws. See Mass Disasters, supra note 46,
140
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Under Juenger's substantive law approach, either Colorado or Arizona law could apply. Since one set of plaintiffs and the defendant reside in Colorado, that law could apply. Or, since the other set of plaintiffs reside in Arizona, and the accident occurred there, Arizona law
could apply. Juenger would require that the same law govern the
claims of both sets of plaintiffs. 141 This would mean that the Arizona
plaintiffs would lose the benefit of the law of their home state if Colorado law applied. Alternatively, the Colorado plaintiffs would get a
"windfall" because they happened to be on a bus with Arizona plaintiffs. Further, as to the Colorado plaintiffs, the Colorado defendant
would lose the protection provided by the Colorado legislature. But
which law is the "most suitable rule of decision" to govern the claims of
both sets of plaintiffs? Is it Colorado law because that law is in accord
with modern trends that seek to limit enterprise tort liability, especially
for noneconomic loss? Or, is it Arizona law either because it is "unjust" to limit recovery for noneconomic loss, or because for some unexplained reason, it is more "just" to favor plaintiffs over defendants?
Again, there is no objective way, or any way at all, by which a court
can determine whether Arizona law or Colorado law is the "most suitable rule of decision."
Professor Juenger's proposed substantive law solution in the products liability and "mass disaster" areas demonstrate the patent unsoundness of the result-selective approach that he advocates. Such an
approach requires the forum court to sacrifice its own policies and interests or the legitimate interests of the other involved state. Further,
the approach simply is unworkable under its own terms. When conflicLing laws, especially modern laws, reflect carefully considered legislative policies, no objective or realistic means exists for a court to determine the "better law." The assumption of Professor Juenger's
substantive law approach, that a court can determine the "better law,"
makes the approach fall of its own weight. Not only is it not the function of an American state court to "devise substantive solutions responsive to the exigencies of multistate transactions," but they could not do
so anyway.
Thus, Professor Juenger's substantive law approach will not "guarantee the predictability and consistency that interest analysis lacks."
Nor will it "produce better results in particular cases." It simply will
at 109. It is difficult to see the "unfairness" since each plaintiff is treated the same in
that each plaintiff gets the measure of recovery afforded by the law of the plaintiff's
home state.
14 See supra note 140.
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not work at all.
Interest analysis, however, does work. It produces functionally sound
and fair results in the cases actually coming before courts for decision.
It does so by focusing on the most rational consideration in making
choice-of-law decisions: the policies reflected in a state's rule of substantive law and a state's interest in applying its law to implement
those policies in the particular case. As this comparison with Juenger's
substantive law approach clarifies, interest analysis indeed is the preferred approach to choice-of-law.
CONCLUSION

Professor Friedrich K. Juenger brings a unique perspective to the
challenge to the interest analysis approach to choice-of-law. In this Essay, I have tried to give his criticisms of interest analysis, and the substantive law approach he proposes in its stead, the respectful consideration due the views of such an outstanding scholar in the field. In
comparing the results that are reached in practice under interest analysis with Professor Juenger's proposed substantive law approach, I believe that I have demonstrated that interest analysis can withstand Professor Juenger's challenge. Consequently, interest analysis will remain
as the preferred approach to choice-of-law in the United States.

